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Karyn L. Freedman, University of Guelph 
 
I am grateful to Rebecca Kukla (2014) for her generous and fair reading of my 
“Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account”. My concern in that paper is 
with the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs 
based on testimony; that is, whether a hearer has an epistemic right to believe what she is 
told in the absence of any evidence about the reliability of a speaker. An interest-relative 
theory of justification is my answer to this question. I argue that beliefs based on 
testimony require evidence for justification, but how much evidence is needed, in any 
given case, depends on the hearer and the epistemic risk she takes in believing that p is 
true. In other words, the evidential burden that an individual must meet in order to be 
justified in believing that p depends on how important it is for her that p is true, given her 
interest in p. The more she cares about p, the more evidence needed to justify her belief 
that p.  
 
Interests and Normativity 
 
In “Testimony and Epistemic Risk” (2014), I argue that we need to look at interests in 
order to assess the normative status of beliefs because evidence, on its own, can’t tell us 
how much evidence is needed in any given case. This view entails a normative 
asymmetry about justified belief, insofar as two individuals with identical evidence about 
p will not be necessarily in normatively symmetrical positions with respect to p; one may 
have a justified belief that p while the other might not.  
 
By using interests to buttress standards of evidence, an interest-relative theory of 
justification helps us make sense of the fact that what we take as evidence, or reasons for 
belief, can have probative force in one case but not in another. Another virtue of this 
account is that it helps to explain the intuitive pull of both the credulist and reductivist 
positions in contemporary debates on testimony. If I am told that p and p is 
inconsequential to me, then the credulist principle of a presumptive right to believe (in 
the absence of defeaters) seems reasonable. If, on the other hand, the risk I take in 
believing that p is high, because for one reason or another I am invested in the truth of p, 
then, as the reductivist suggests, someone’s say-so is insufficient evidence that p.  
 
I think this model of justification applies to all of our beliefs, however they are acquired, 
but it is crystallized in the case of beliefs based on testimony, not because we are more 
deeply invested in the kinds of things that we can learn from being told but rather because 
of the social nature of testimony. The fact that in testimonial exchanges the hearer must 
rely on the competence and sincerity of the teller means that the opportunities for error 
are more than in the usual case of first-person observation. 
 
Addressing Inductive Risk 
 
Kukla offers a number of thoughtful objections to this account, and her discussion of the 
inductive risk literature with respect to hypothesis acceptance in science presents an 
interesting counterpart to it. Indeed, it is apropos of this literature that Kukla raises her 
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main concern about my account. Although Kukla accepts that justification is interest-
relative (49, 2014), she worries that once we move in the direction of interest-relativity 
we encounter a complex and vicious regress of varying values, epistemic risk and 
evidence standards which threatens to undermine the justification of any one belief. As I 
shall argue, however, this worry is unfounded. The problem of varying evidential 
standards poses a legitimate concern in the case of collaborative research (in science and 
elsewhere), in particular when it comes to group accountability. However, outside of a 
group context the threat of a regress fades, and I am happy to have this opportunity to 
explain why this is so. 
 
But first, I want to respond to a secondary concern that Kukla raises about my account. In 
(2014) I distinguish my interest-relative theory of justification from interest-relative 
accounts found in the pragmatic encroachment literature (e.g. Fantl and McGrath, 2002). 
I do so because I think that a focus on practical interests is problematically narrow. As I 
argue in (2014), I might care about a matter because it has an impact on some action that 
I undertake, but I might instead care about a matter because I am emotionally invested in 
it. That is, it may bear on my general happiness or well being, even if it has no impact on 
my actions.  
 
Kukla is skeptical about my attempt to distinguish my position from these similar 
positions in the pragmatic encroachment literature. She looks at an example that I offer 
about George Santayana: 
 
Imagine, for instance, that when I was a graduate student George 
Santayana was a philosophical hero of mine, but that I am no longer very 
interested in his work and have no on-going research relating to his 
philosophy. Still, suppose that I hold him in high esteem, until, that is, I 
hear that he was anti-Semitic. Suppose further that this little known fact 
about Santayana bears on my opinion of him, such that I sincerely hope 
that it is false. In this case, while I have no practical stake in the claim that 
Santayana is anti-Semitic I care about its truth and, again, really hope that 
it is false (8, 2014).  
 
In (2014) I argue that in light of my high regard for Santayana, the epistemic risk I take in 
believing a testimonial report about his purported anti-Semitism is high. According to 
Kukla, however, “the dualism between emotional and practical investments seems pretty 
fragile and surface-level” (47, 2014). As Kukla sees it, if I am truly emotionally invested 
in Santayana and his purported anti-Semitism, then there will be at least some practical 
consequences of this fact on my behavior and decision-making. Maybe, as she suggests, I 
will not display his book cover on my office wall, or perhaps I will stop announcing to 
my students that he is my favourite philosopher, or maybe I will twist my hands 
anxiously when rereading my earlier papers about him (47, 2014).  
 
Although Kukla is right that it is possible to squeeze some minimal practical 
consequences from nearly all of our beliefs, as an objection to broadening the notion of 
interests to encompass our general well being in addition to practical concerns, this 
misses its mark. In examples like the Santayana one, the practical consequences of my 
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belief that p are unforeseen and, more importantly, unintended. They are simply not the 
reason why, in the first place, the epistemic risk I take in believing that p is high. To deny 
this is to diminish the legitimate role that our general well being plays in raising or 
lowering evidential standards for justified belief.  
 
Suppose that I love the sport of tennis and that, in particular, my favourite player is Roger 
Federer. Imagine that, while at the grocery store on my way home from work, I overhear 
a woman say that Federer lost his French Open quarterfinal match earlier that day. 
Because of the enormous disappointment I will experience if this claim turns out to be 
true, I decide to reserve belief, to the degree to which I am able, until I can get home to 
my computer and double check this information. And that is just what I ought to do, 
given the raised evidential burden I face in light of the epistemic risk I take in believing 
that Federer lost is true.  
 
My emotional investment in Federer’s success is why the epistemic risk I take in 
believing that p is high. No doubt that if p is true, there will be some incidental practical 
consequences to my believing that p. Perhaps I won’t bother tuning in to watch the final 
match. But since that is not the reason why the epistemic risk I take in believing that p is 
high, it does no explanatory work in accounting for the raised evidential standards I must 
meet in order to have a justified belief that p. If we want to be able to account for the 
epistemic risk believers take in cases like this one, then we need to broaden our notion of 
interests beyond the strictly practical.  
 
Kukla’s main objection to my account has a different focus, and she develops it through a 
discussion of theories of inductive risk regarding hypothesis acceptance in science. There 
is a rich literature on inductive risk in science (e.g. Rudner 1953, Douglas 2000), and I 
am grateful to Kukla for drawing out the similarities between that work and my interest-
relative theory of justification.  
 
As she notes, the inductive risk theorist and I agree that it is not possible to decide how 
much evidence is enough evidence to justify a belief, or warrant acceptance of a 
hypothesis, without reference to an individual’s interests, or values. For the inductive risk 
theorist, that’s because, as Kukla puts it, “there is no standard inherent in the evidence 
itself about how to balance inductive risks” (48, 2014). I make a similar point when I 
state that evidence, on its own, can never tell us how much evidence we need to justify a 
belief that p, or whether p is worth inquiring over, in the first place (9, 2014). That claim 
is the basis of my criticism against strict evidentialism (my main target in (2014)) and the 
motivation for my argument in favour of an interest-relative theory of justification. 
 
In my discussion of interests, I focus on the epistemic risk we take in believing that p is 
true, given our interest in p. But Kukla argues that there are, in fact, two kinds of risks 
that we take when considering that p. There is what the inductive risk theorist calls a 
‘type one’ error, which is the risk we take in accepting a hypothesis that is false, and 
there is also what is called a ‘type two’ error, which is the risk we take in rejecting a 
hypothesis that is true (48, 2014).  
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Because the main job of a theory of justification is setting the conditions for evaluating 
the normative status of beliefs, type two errors get overlooked in an account like mine, 
since they do not result in belief. Still, this elaboration of the kinds of risk inherent in 
decision-making in science adds a welcome complexity to our understanding of belief-
acceptance more generally. My hesitation in believing that Federer lost his match is due 
to the disappointment I will experience if this turns out to be true. Because I care about 
the truth of p, I ought to be equally mindful about overcautiously rejecting p as I am in 
hastily accepting it. And while a theory of justification is not strictly concerned with 
those beliefs that we reject (this matter might better be left for a virtue theoretic account 
of epistemic character), our interests set the appropriate bar for accepting evidence, and 
this, as Kukla rightly says, “is a matter of trading off risks rather than being lax or 
stringent about minimizing them” (49, 2014).  
 
According to Kukla, the interest-relative theory of justification has more or less got this 
right. If S tells me that p I need to decide if her word is sufficient evidence that p, given 
my interest in p. But here is where things get messy, Kukla argues, because S, in turn, 
“will have necessarily drawn on her own interests in order to set her own evidence bar 
that p” (49, 2014). And this, says Kukla, triggers a vicious regress, because in deciding 
what to believe we have to be able to tolerate the epistemic risk we take in counting on 
other people and their interest-driven evidence bars, “reaching back effectively ad 
infinintum” (50, 2014). As Kukla sees it, this is a problem for our everyday informal 
knowledge, and it is particularly acute in contemporary science, which is what she calls 
“radically collaborative” (50, 2014).  
 
Collaboration and Justification 
 
In recent years, philosophers have taken note of the collaborative nature of contemporary 
science, which poses a challenge to the traditional idea of the modern knower as 
individualistic and self-reliant. As John Hardwig argues, contemporary science highlights 
our epistemic dependence on others (1991). As Hardwig explains, a good portion of 
scientific research is done by individuals in research teams, and it is not unusual for data 
to be gathered by many dozens of researchers working independently on different aspects 
of an experiment or theory (694-695, 1991).  
 
Kukla offers a snapshot of this phenomenon from the biomedical research world, in her 
“'Author TBD': Radical Collaboration in Contemporary Biomedical Research” (2012). 
She describes a 2011 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine which has 5 original 
research articles, each one authored by between 6 and 27 individuals, most written on 
behalf of larger research groups, with links to supplementary appendices listing hundreds 
more collaborators, and so on (847, 2012).  
 
Hardwig is looking at the epistemic division of labour in contemporary science in order 
to explore the role of trust in knowledge. Kukla is interested in a different problem; her 
worry is not so much trust, but group accountability. As she puts it, “the epistemic 
division of labor in contemporary medical research is decentralized, complex, and deeply 
messy, and no one is accountable for the ways in which interests shape the research 
process” (857, 2012). This is a pressing concern in the case of contemporary science.  
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If research projects are radically decentralized, stretched out over hundreds of 
collaborators, then who, we might well wonder, is accountable for the study as a whole? 
And if labour is distributed among researchers who are basing their decisions using 
varying sets of interests and thus evidential standards, then we should not be surprised to 
find varying methodological standards at play within the research results. Kukla makes 
this worry explicit in her “Accountability and Values in Radically Collaborative 
Research” (2014), with Winsberg and Huebner. In that paper they argue that “This 
opaque fracturing of interests seems to undermine the possibility that anyone can vouch 
for there being, somewhere or somehow, a coherent justificatory story to be told about 
how the study was designed and implemented, or what process let to the reported 
results.” (20, 2014).  
 
This ‘opaque fracturing of interests’ nicely illustrates Kukla’s worry about a vicious 
regress in the case of theory acceptance in science, which is decentralized and hence 
distributed among dozens, if not hundreds of collaborators. As Kukla says, “The values 
and interests that shape a research project may thus be buried so far down that they are 
impossible to retrieve (856, 2012). But the question of how to account for the overall 
objectives of a radically decentralized research team is unlike the question posed by a 
theory of justification, which is centered on whether one’s own intellectual house is in 
order.  
 
A theory of justification sets the standard for evaluating whether we have been suitably 
careful in forming our beliefs insofar as our overall aim is to have a true and consistent 
set of beliefs. Different theories of justification offer up different standards of evaluation. 
On an interest-relative theory of justification, that evaluation is based on whether an 
individual has sufficient evidence for her belief that p given her interest in p, that is, 
given the epistemic risk she takes in believing that p is true. Certainly, the evidence we 
draw upon to justify our beliefs often depends on the intellectual labour of others, on their 
competence and sincerity, as influenced by their particular interest-driven evidence bars. 
But there is no threat of a regress here. Indeed, the only real threat is relying on someone 
who turns out to be unreliable, and thus winding up with a false (if justified) belief.  
 
Let’s return to beliefs based on testimony. If your word that p is sufficient evidence for 
my belief that p, given my interest in p, then my belief that p will be justified based on 
your say-so, whether or not you are a competent (or sincere) teller. If you are 
justificationally lax, if your standard of evidence with respect to p is lower than it ought 
to be, for whatever reason, then I might end up with a justified false belief that p. If, on 
the other hand, your standard of evidence with respect to p is high, if you are a competent 
(and sincere) teller, then I will likely end up with a justified true belief that p. Either way, 
so long as I have met the evidential standards set by my interest in p, then, according to 
an interest-relative theory of justification, my belief that p will be justified. 
 
Take the Federer example. Suppose that I simply can’t wait to get to my computer to 
verify the potentially disastrous news about Federer, such that on my drive home from 
the grocery store I decide to call my partner who confirms that, indeed, Federer lost his 
French Open quarterfinal match earlier that day. My belief that p is now firmly 
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entrenched, to my enormous disappointment. And it is also justified, given that the 
evidential standard set by my interest in p is now cleared.  
 
Now, suppose that p is false. Suppose that the woman at the grocery store and my partner 
both got it wrong. Maybe the woman at the grocery store, who doesn’t herself care much 
for tennis, was just repeating something that she had heard someone else carelessly 
report. And maybe my partner, who thinks my devotion to Federer is excessive, decided 
to play a bad joke on me. Does the sincerity and/or competence of either teller 
compromise my justified belief that p? Not at all, according to an interest-relative theory 
of justification. This is a bit of bad luck, to be sure, but bad luck does not undermine the 
epistemic labour that I have exerted in order to ensure that I have sufficient evidence in 
favour of p, given my interest in p, nor does it undermine the rationality that I display in 
believing that p, given my reasons for p. Thus, while it is true that in the case of 
testimony what we believe depends on the word of others and how truth-motivated they 
are, this poses no threat to the question of whether one’s own intellectual house is in 
order.  
 
There is an analogy to be made here with Foley’s demon world hypothesis (1985), which 
I discuss in (2014). Imagine two individuals with the identical mental content, but one 
exists in this world and one exists in a demon-world. In the demon-world the individual 
believes, remembers, and experiences just what he in this world believes, remembers, and 
experiences, but in the demon-world the evil demon has insured that all of his beliefs are 
false (189-190, 1985).  
 
Foley uses this thought experiment to illustrate the internalist (or anti-reliabilist) intuition 
that if two individuals have the same subjective experiences then to the extent that one of 
them is justified in his beliefs, so is the other, even in the case where one of the 
individuals’ beliefs are all false. After all, as Foley notes, being tricked by a demon does 
not make a person less rational; it just makes her unlucky (190, 1985). The same goes for 
beliefs based on unreliable testimony, according to the interest-relative theory of 
justification. So long as a hearer meets the standard of evidence with respect to p set by 
her interest in p, then her belief that p will be justified, regardless of the varying interests 
and evidence standards of others.  
 
Clearing the Evidence Bar 
 
These varying interests and evidence standards threaten to trigger a regress only when we 
move away from the normative requirements for justified belief to the accountability of 
the overall goals, theory-acceptance, and decision-making of a radically decentralized 
research group. Kukla is thus wrong to suggest that: “It’s not enough we set our own 
evidence bar in accordance with our interests” (50, 2014). That is precisely just what we 
must do to meet the normative standards given by an interest-relative theory of 
justification. The problem of group accountability that is threatened by the collaborative 
nature of contemporary science is simply not, contra Kukla, a problem when it comes to 
our everyday informal knowledge. 
 
Contact details: karynf@uoguelph.ca 
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